Directed chiefly toward scholars in literary criticism and theory, Peircean semiotics, and, more generally, philosophy, this book is, by the nature of its broad focus, more descriptive than critical, synthetic rather than overtly prescriptive. Beginning with a brief discussion of Peirce and deconstruction, the author then turns to the relevance of current concepts in science and the philosophy of science as well as mathematics—especially Gödel's theorems. Subsequently, a series of "thought experiments" is used to illustrate that some concepts propounded by deconstruction are compatible with certain aspects of the "new physics." The notion of writing is compared to Karl Popper's philosophy of science, and finally, a discussion of Beckett rounds out the author's general thesis.
Preface
Acknowledgments
Introduction
CHAPTER ONE: Introducing Some Unnamables
CHAPTER TWO: Whose Science Are We Speaking of When We Speak of Science?
CHAPTER THREE: Deconstruction Meets a. Mathematician
CHAPTER FOUR: Immanence Knows No Boundaries
CHAPTER FIVE: The Unlimited Web of Writing
CHAPTER SIX: Who's Afraid of Anomalies?
CHAPTER SEVEN: Beckett's Dilemma: or, Pecking Away at the Ineffable
Postscript
Appendix to Chapter Three
Notes
References
Index